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Abstract
Behavioral di¤erences between economies where infrastructure is
privately provided and where the government is the sole provider are
examined in the context of a growing economy. The choice between
private and public provision generates di¤erences in the private sectors
ability to internalize capital utilization decisions and market prices
along the equilibrium path. This in turn has a crucial impact on
the e¤ects of scal policy on resource allocation and welfare in each
regime. If the government wants to stimulate infrastructure invest-
ment, a subsidy to private providers yields signicantly higher welfare
gains than an equivalent increase in direct government investment,
even with lump-sum tax nancing. On the other hand, an income
tax is more distortionary under private than under government pro-
vision. In designing optimal scal policy, while a constant income
tax-infrastructure subsidy combination is jointly required to attain the
rst-best equilibrium under private provision, the optimal income tax
rate must be time-varying under government provision.
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1 Introduction
The recent policy shift in developing countries towards market provision of many goods and
services traditionally viewed as being in the domain of "public goods" has once again put into
question the role of government in economic progress. One such "public good" is infrastructure
services, which include roads, power, water and sewerage, irrigation, transportation and communi-
cations. While privately provided infrastructure services are quite common in the developed world,
their provision in the developing world is still perceived to be in the governments domain, though
that perception is rapidly changing. The 1990s witnessed the rst major shift from government to
private provision, with 132 low- and middle-income countries transferring about 2,500 infrastruc-
ture projects to the private sector. A recent World Bank study estimates that between 1990-2002,
private sector commitments to infrastructure in developing countries totalled about $805 billion, or
$62 billion per year, which accounted for about 25 percent of total infrastructure spending (Estache,
2004).1 The privatization of infrastructure in the developing countries has mainly been driven by
a rapid growth in demand and increasing public disenchantment with the performance and qual-
ity of state-provided services.2 At the same time, many governments have signicantly reduced
public-sector spending and borrowing following the debt and scal crises of the 1980s. Though
infrastructure capital (often referred to as "public capital") has been regarded as an essential ingre-
dient for growth and development, very little attention has been paid to the issue of its provision
in the growth literature.3
This paper studies the behavioral di¤erences between economies where infrastructure is privately
provided and those in which the government is the sole provider, and how these di¤erences, in turn,
determine the impact of scal policy on macroeconomic performance and welfare. In capturing
these behavioral di¤erences, we focus on two characteristics of public goods that are potentially
important for their pricing and provision, namely rivalry and excludability; see Cornes and Sandler
(1996). Excludability implies that the services from an underlying public good may not be available
to all users, possibly due to a pricing mechanism (e.g. user fees and tolls). On the other hand,
rivalry means that the services derived by an individual from a public good may be a¤ected by the
services derived by others. Though the initial literature on public investment and growth treated
infrastructure as a "pure" public good which is non-rival and non-excludable, later works have
1Estache (2004) points out that a major incentive for growing private participation in infrastructure provision
is the high expected returns from investment. Canning and Bennathan (2000) and Briceno et al. (2004) estimate
that in developing countries, the expected returns from investment in telecommunications are between 30-40 percent,
while the corresponding returns in electricity generation and road construction are 40 and 80 percent, respectively.
2One excellent example can be found in India which, till the early 1990s, was basically a closed economy with
a huge public sector that operated on strong socialist principles. During the 1990s, as India embarked on an
elaborate phase of liberalization, infrastructure provision and privatization became contentious issues. Recently, it
was announced that the newly proposed interstate highway system will be privately built and operated, with tolls and
user fees being the main instruments of nancing. While the telecommunications sector has been largely privatized,
the nations airport system is also currently under privatization. Some states have privatized the provision of power
and electricity as well. A recent survey of Indias economic reforms can be found in Ahluwalia (2002).
3The volumnous empirical literature on the productivity impact of infrastructure or "public capital" started with
the ndings of Aschauer (1989), and an early review can be found in Gramlich (1994).
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indeed studied these properties, albeit to varying degrees.4 However, most of this literature assumes
that infrastructure capital is provided directly by the government and the private sector merely
takes its stock as exogenously given in making allocation decisions.5 It is therefore important to
study the e¤ects of excludability and rivalry when infrastructure is privately provided in comparison
to when it is publicly provided.
The concept of excludability admits the existence of an implicit or explicit pricing system that
can prevent universal access to a public good. In the context of infrastructure, excludability might
arise through the imposition of "user fees" like tolls, taxes, or entrance fees. Ott and Turnovsky
(2006) discuss examples of di¤erent types of highway toll systems (time based and distance based)
prevalent in the European Union. However, the existence of a pricing mechanism also raises the
possibility of market provision of infrastructure, and the case for government provision is thereby
weakened. On the other hand, when private providers are responsible for nancing and pricing
infrastructure capital, it is important to understand the determinants of such a pricing structure.
We argue that the market price of infrastructure must be linked not only to its own usage, but to
the usage of private capital as well. We formalize the concept of usage by introducing endogenous
utilization decisions for both private capital and infrastructure, and linking them to the correspond-
ing depreciation rates.6 This innovation turns out to be critically important, as the internalization
of these utilization decisions varies according to the mode of provision of infrastructure.
To compare our analysis to the existing literature, we assume that while government-provided
infrastructure capital is non-excludable, the corresponding services provided by the private sector
are excludable. Therefore, under private provision, a user (in our case, the representative agent)
can internalize the e¤ects of utilization of both private and infrastructure capital on the production
of output, and therefore has the exibility to adjust resource allocation along these margins in
response to a scal shock. It turns out that the utilization rates of the two types of capital are
interdependent along the equilibrium path and jointly determine their respective market prices. In
contrast, when the government provides the entire stock of infrastructure, the underlying services
are non-excludable and, consequently, treated as exogenously given by the private agent. The
agent, therefore, does not internalize the e¤ect of its allocation decisions on the accumulation,
4The formal treatment of public investment in an intertemporal framework can be traced to Arrow and Kurz
(1970) in the context of the neoclassical growth model. Though Barro (1990) revived this discussion in the context
of endogenous growth, these early papers assumed non-rivalry in modeling public investment. Later contributions,
however, have incorporated rivalry in growth models, mainly in the form of congestion; See, for example, Turnovsky
(1996), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998). Excludability has been studied extensively
in the public economics literature, as in Brito and Oakland (1980), Burns and Walsh (1981) and Fraser (1996).
However, it has received very limited attention in the growth literature, though a recent contribution can be found
in Ott and Turnovsky (2006).
5See, for example, Baxter and King (1993), Futagami et al. (1993), and Rioja (2003).
6The concept of capital utilization refers to the intensity or frequency with which capital equipment is operated,
and is a popular construct in the business cycle literature; see Keynes (1936) for a very early discussion, and Lucas
(1970), Calvo (1975), and Greenwood et al. (1988) for more recent contributions. In the context of intertemporal
growth, its use is less prevalent, though some recent studies by Imbs (1999), Dalgaard (2003), and Chatterjee (2005)
have demonstrated its importance for the dynamics of growth and convergence. However, to our knowledge, there
is no known study of capital utilization in models of public investment and growth.
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utilization, and depreciation of the government-provided infrastructure capital. This behavioral
di¤erence between the two regimes leads to critical di¤erences in their responses to scal policy
shocks, which eventually translate into substantial di¤erences in welfare gains or losses.
The accumulation and usage of infrastructure also generates externalities that lead to some
form of rivalry. Congestion is a classic example of rivalry and has been extensively studied in
the growth literature (see footnote 3). We extend the notion of rivalry to introduce a production
externality that can either reinforce or o¤set the e¤ects of congestion. Specically, we assume
that the economy-wide ratio of infrastructure to private capital generates an aggregate production
externality for the private agent. For example, given the stock of private capital, an increase in
the stock of infrastructure mitigates the e¤ects of congestion (e.g. given the number of cars, if the
number of lanes in a highway is increased) and has a positive impact on aggregate productivity.
Conversely, given the stock of infrastructure, if the stock of private capital increases, then the
e¤ects of congestion are enhanced, with a dampening e¤ect on productivity. The congestion and
production externality parameters are, therefore, important determinants of the market prices of
the two capital stocks and their respective utilization rates.
Our paper is related to a small literature that has studied the provision of infrastructure or
"public capital" in the context of growth. The rst mention of the possibility of private provision
can be found in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), though they do not provide any formal treatment.
A formal analysis, however, is provided by Devarajan et al. (1998), who examine the choice between
private and public provision by evaluating the distortions created by the tax system in nancing
either direct government provision or subsidies to private providers. More recently, Chatterjee
(2006) generalizes the Devarajan et al. framework to the open economy and shows that the choice
between private and government provision depends crucially on the economys structural parameters
such as the elasticity of substitution in production and the size of externalities, as well as borrowing
constraints in international capital markets.
We distinguish our approach from the previous literature by focusing on certain aspects of in-
frastructure provision absent from previous analyses. First, we focus on behavioral di¤erences
between the regimes of private and government provision. Second, we examine excludability and
pricing of infrastructure by explicitly introducing endogenous utilization decisions. The inherent
di¤erences in the extent to which these decisions are internalized across the two regimes eventu-
ally end up determining their welfare responses to policy shocks. Third, the literature on private
provision does not examine the consequences of rivalry, whereas we introduce both congestion and
an aggregate production externality that signicantly a¤ect utilization rates and market prices.
Fourth, we adopt a more exible budget constraint for the government by introducing lump-sum
taxes and debt nancing. This aspect is absent both in Devarajan et al. (1998) and Chatter-
jee (2006), who focus primarily on the distortions created by the income tax as the government
balances its budget. By allowing for non-distortionary sources of nancing, we can decouple the
e¤ects of spending and revenue generation, making the comparison between the two regimes more
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transparent. This feature of the model also enables us to address another important issue absent
from the previous literature: how private and government provision of infrastructure a¤ect the
design of optimal scal policy.7
Our results indicate that if the government wants to stimulate infrastructure investment, a
targeted subsidy to private providers yields signicantly higher welfare gains than if the government
were to directly provide the additional investment without any private involvement. This result is
robust to both the underlying nancing instrument (lump-sum versus distortionary taxation) and
variations in the congestion and production externality parameters. Therefore, asymmetric tax
distortions (as in Devarajan et al., 1998) or structural conditions (as in Chatterjee, 2006) are not
essential in comparing the two modes of infrastructure provision. Rather, the inherent di¤erences in
the extent to which excludability (or the lack of it) permits the internalization of utilization decisions
and market prices form the crux of our explanation. This represents a signicant departure from
earlier analysis, which assumed that if the government has non-distortionary nancing instruments
at its disposal, the choice between public and private provision is irrelevant. We also nd that an
income tax is more distortionary in a privatized economy than under government provision, because
an increase in the income tax rate reduces the market return to both private and infrastructure
capital and causes adjustments in both capital stocks as well as their utilization rates. However,
under government provision, the agent takes infrastructure as exogenously given and therefore
has only one margin of adjustment, which is private capital and its utilization. Again, the
introduction of endogenous capital utilization leads to a sharp contrast with Devarajan et al. (1998),
who nd that tax distortions are higher under government provision. As for the design of optimal
scal policy, we show that under private provision, the government needs both an income tax
and infrastructure subsidy to attain the rst best optimum. By contrast, under direct government
provision, the burden of attaining optimality falls solely on a time-varying income tax rate, because
under government provision, the market price of infrastructure and its utilization rate are not
internalized by the private agent, and thus a time-varying tax rate must be imposed to track the
dynamic adjustment of these variables.
2 Analytical Framework
We consider N identical and innitely lived representative agents, who maximize utility from
consumption according to
U =
Z 1
0
C

e tdt;  1 <   1 (1)
Each agent also produces output (Y ) using its individual stocks of private capital (K) and in-
frastructure capital (Kg). The accumulation of private capital, dened as an amalgam of physical
7There is no discussion of optimal scal policy in earlier studies on this issue, such as Devarajan et al. (1998) and
Chatterjee (2006). In these papers, the absence of lump-sum taxes or other non-distortionary nancing instruments
in the governments budget constraint generates time-inconsistency in implementing optimal scal policy.
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and human capital, is undertaken by the agent, while infrastructure capital may be provided either
"privately" (by the representative agent, in which case it would be excludable) or "publicly" (by
the government, where it would be non-excludable). The production function can be described as
follows
Y = A
 Kg
K
"
(ukK)
  Ksg1  ; 0 <  < 1; 0  " < 1; 0 < "+  < 1 (2)
where K and Kg represent the economy-wide aggregate stocks of private capital and infrastructure,
respectively, while K and Kg denote the corresponding stocks available to an individual agent.
The accumulation and usage of the two factors of production generate two sources of externalities
for the private sector, which the individual agent cannot internalize. The rst is a congestion
externality, which impacts on the services derived from infrastructure. Dening uk and ug as
the respective rates of utilization of private capital and infrastructure, we specify that the services
derived from the agents stock of infrastructure capital, Ksg , are proportional to (i) the usage of the
privately owned stock of infrastructure (ugKg), and (ii) the usage of the agents individual stock of
private capital relative to its aggregate stock:8
Ksg = ugKg

ukK
K
1 
; 0    1 (2a)
where  measures the degree of relative congestion. Additionally, given the aggregate stock of
utilized private capital, the accumulation of the economy-wide stock of infrastructure helps mitigate
the e¤ects of congestion, thereby generating an aggregate production externality, captured by " in
(2).9
The aggregate utilized stocks of private and infrastructure capital are dened as
K = N(uKK) (2b)
Kg = N(ugKg) (2c)
The rates of accumulation of each type of capital are given by
_K = I   k(uk)K (3a)
_Kg = G  g(ug)Kg (3b)
8We dene the rate of utilization (or usage) of a given type of capital stock (private or infrastructure) as the
speed or intensity with which it is operated (for example, "workweek," "hours per day," etc.), as in Taubman and
Wilkinson (1970) and Calvo (1975).
9The aggregate production externality captures two o¤setting aspects of the factor accumulation and utilization
process on the economys capacity to produce output. For example, given a stock of roads and highways, the number
of cars driven on them generates congestion and reduces the aggregate output elasticity of private capital. On
the other hand, given the usage of private cars, more roads might reduce the e¤ects of congestion and enhance the
economys productive capacity. For an example of a similar aggregate production externality in the context of foreign
aid and growth, see Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2006).
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where I and G measure the ow of new investment into the two capital goods, respectively, and
k and g denote their corresponding depreciation rates. A critical point to note here is that the
rates of depreciation of each capital good depend on their respective rates of utilization:
i(ui) =
u
i
i
i
; i > 1; i = k; g (4)
The parameters i (i = k; g) in (4) measure the elasticity of depreciation with respect to utilization
of the underlying stock of capital.10 Finally, we assume that the accumulation of both types of
capital is costly and involves convex costs of adjustment
  (I;K) = I

1 +
h1
2
I
K

(5a)

 (G;Kg) = G

1 +
h2
2
G
Kg

(5b)
The budget constraints for the representative agent and the government will depend on how
infrastructure is provided in an economy, i.e., whether it is provided by the (i) private representative
agent, (ii) government, or (iii) a social planner (in this case both capital goods are provided by the
planner). The sections below describe each regime of infrastructure provision.
3 Private Provision of Infrastructure
Under this regime, the representative agent provides both private and infrastructure capital
and chooses their respective rates of utilization. As a result, infrastructure, just like private capital,
is an excludable good. However, the agentsfailure to internalize the externalities associated with
the two types of capital provides an incentive for government intervention. Such an intervention
can take place through a wide array of scal instruments, namely the income tax (y), a tax on
interest income ( b) generated by the issue of government bonds (b), a lump-sum tax (T ), and a
subsidy targeted for infrastructure investment (s). The private agents ow budget constraint is
given by
_b = (1   b) rb+ (1  y)Y   C     (I;K)  (1  s) 
 (G;Kg)  T (6a)
The government nances any excess of expenditures over tax revenues by issuing debt in the form
of innitesimally short government bonds. The evolution of government debt is described by
_b = (1   b) rb+ s
 (G;Kg)  yY   T (6b)
10i = ui
0(ui)=(ui); i = k; g: Under this specication, the marginal depreciation cost of utilization of a capital
stock, 0i(ui); is variable. Note that as i ! 1; i(ui) ! 0 and ui ! 1: The conventional assumption in the
growth literature is that of a constant depreciation rate, so that 0i(ui) = 0 and ui = 1: Equation (4) represents the
"depreciation-in-use" function, which is a standard specication in many Real Business Cycle models; see Burnside
and Eichenbaum (1996).
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Finally, the relevant production function for the representative agent is
Y = A
 Kg
K
"
(uKK)
1 (1 ) (ugKg)1  ( K)( 1)(1 ) (7)
Combining (6a) and (6b) yields the economys aggregate resource constraint
Y = C +   (I;K) + 
 (G;Kg) (8)
The representative agent maximizes (1), subject to (3a), (3b), (6a), and (7), while taking note of
(4), (5a) and (5b). It is important to emphasize here that though the aggregate relationships (2b)
and (2c) are not internalized by the agent in performing its optimization, they hold in equilibrium.
Also, in deriving the equilibrium conditions, we have normalized N = 1, without loss of generality.
The optimality conditions are
C 1 =  (9a)
A(1  y)[1  (1  )]

ugKg
K
1 ( ")
u " 1k
qk
= u
k 1
k (9b)
A(1  y)(1  )

ukK
Kg
 " u" g
qg
= u
g 1
g (9c)
i  I
Y
=

qk   1
h1

K
Y

(9d)
g  G
Y
=

qg   1
h2

Kg
Y

(9e)
  
_

= (1   b)r (9f)
_qk
qk
+
A(1  y)[1  (1  )]u "k u1 ( ")g (Kg=K)1 ( ")
qk
+
(qk   1)2
2h1qk
  k(uk) = (1   b)r (9g)
_qg
qg
+
A(1  y)(1  )u "k u1 ( ")g (Kg=K)" 
qg
+
(qg + s  1)2
2(1  s)h2qg   g(ug) = (1   b)r (9h)
The above optimality conditions can be interpreted as follows. (9a) equates the marginal utility
from consumption to that of private wealth, measured by the shadow price . Equations (9b) and
(9c) represent the optimal decisions regarding the utilization of the two capital stocks, respectively.
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(9b) equates the after-tax marginal benet from utilizing private capital, valued by its shadow
price, to its marginal depreciation cost. Similarly, (9c) equates the after-tax marginal benet and
cost of utilizing infrastructure.11 Two things must be noted here. First, the factor utilization
decisions do not internalize the congestion and production externalities ( and "), and hence are
sub-optimal. Second, given that infrastructure has certain public-good characteristics, (9c) is also
a formal statement of exclusion, showing that the usage of infrastructure depends, among other
things, on its shadow price, qg. (9d) and (9e) describe the allocation of output to investment
in the two capital goods, respectively. These allocations depend (i) positively on the respective
shadow prices and (ii) inversely on the respective average products. As a result, the fraction of
output allocated to either capital good is time-varying along the transition path to the steady-state
equilibrium. Equations (9f)-(9h) represent no-arbitrage conditions for consumption, private capital
and infrastructure respectively, thereby ensuring an interior equilibrium allocation. Equations (9g)
and (9h) also describe the evolution of the shadow (market) price of each capital good, which is
crucial for clearing their respective markets.
The optimality conditions can also be used to derive the equilibrium growth rates for private
capital, infrastructure, and consumption, respectively:
	k =
_K
K
=
qk   1
h1
  k(uk) (10a)
	g =
_Kg
Kg
=
qg + s  1
(1  s)h2   g(ug) (10b)
	c =
_C
C
=
(1   b)r   
1   (10c)
Note that the growth rates of both private capital and infrastructure depend on their respective
utilization rates. Moreover, (10b) clearly illustrates the dual role played by the subsidy in inu-
encing the evolution of the privately provided stock of infrastructure: it increases the shadow price
and lowers the cost of investment, thereby encouraging its accumulation.
3.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The presence of both private capital and infrastructure implies that the equilibrium path will be
characterized by transitional dynamics. Therefore, we will describe the macroeconomic equilibrium
in terms of the shadow prices qk and qg and the following stationary variables: z = Kg=K, the ratio
of infrastructure to private capital, and c = C=K, the consumption-private capital ratio. The rst
step in deriving the macroeconomic equilibrium is the determination of the equilibrium utilization
rates for private capital and infrastructure. These can be obtained by solving the static equilibrium
11The shadow prices qk and qg are measured in terms of the (unitary) price of government bonds. Consequently,
the shadow value of wealth, , is used as a numeraire.
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conditions (9b) and (9c):
uk  uk (qk; qg; z) =
"
1
z(g 1)(1 )
q
g+ 1
k q
1 
g
# 1

(11a)
ug  ug (qk; qg; z) =
"
2
z(1 k)
qk q
k 
g
# 1

(11b)
where,  =  ";  =   g + (1  )k   kg ;1 = [1  (1  )]g+ 1 (1 )1  [A(1  y)]g ,
and 2 = [1  (1  )] (1   )k  [A(1  y)]k . Note that  represents the aggregate output
elasticity of private capital (after considering its external e¤ects on productivity).
The utilization rates for the two capital stocks depend on shadow prices, the infrastructure-
private capital ratio, and on the structural, policy, and externality parameters of the model. To
get some intuition on the behavior of the utilization rates, consider the following partial derivatives,
under the mild restriction that  > 0:
@uk
@z
=
(g   1)(1  )

uk
z

> 0;
@ug
@z
=
(1  k)

ug
z

< 0
@uk
@qk
=
(1  g   )


uk
qk

< 0;
@ug
@qk
=  


ug
qk

< 0
@uk
@qg
=
(  1)


uk
qg

< 0;
@ug
@qg
=
(  k)


ug
qg

< 0
Intuitively, an increase in the proportion of infrastructure relative to private capital enhances the
marginal product of private capital (being complementary inputs in production), thereby increasing
its rate of utilization. On the other hand, in the presence of diminishing returns, an increase in
infrastructure reduces its own average and marginal product, leading to a decline in its own rate
of utilization. The respective utilization rates are also negatively related to the shadow (market)
prices of the two capital goods, indicating that an increase in price makes investment costly, thereby
reducing the rates of utilization. Further, (11a) and (11b) immediately determine the equilibrium
depreciation rates of each capital good, as well as their evolution over time.
The core equilibrium dynamics can be expressed as
_z
z

_Kg
Kg
 
_K
K
=

qg + s  1
(1  s)h2   g(ug)

 

qk   1
h1
  k(uk)

(12a)
_qk = (1   b)rqk  A(1  y)[1  (1  )]uku1 g z1   
(qk   1)2
2h1
+ k(uk)qk (12b)
_qg = (1   b)rqg  A(1  y)(1  )uku1 g z   
(qg + s  1)2
2(1  s)h2 + g(ug)qg (12c)
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where uk and ug are given in (11). The evolution of the consumption-private capital ratio is
independent of the core dynamics and is given by
_c
c

_C
C
 
_K
K
=

(1   b)r   
1  

 

qk   1
h1
  k(uk)

(12d)
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by balanced growth and is attained when _z =
_qk = _qg = _c = 0:
~qg + s  1
(1  s)h2   g(~ug) =
~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (13a)
A(1  y)[1  (1  )]~uk ~u1 g ~z1 
~qk
+
(~qk   1)2
2h1~qk
  k(~uk) = (1   b)~r (13b)
A(1  y)(1  )~uk ~u1 g ~z 
~qg
+
(~qg + s  1)2
2(1  s)h2~qg   g(~ug) = (1   b)~r (13c)
(1   b)~r   
1   =
~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (13d)
In addition, the aggregate resource constraint in steady state is given by
A~uk ~u
1 
g ~z
1  = ~c+
~q2k   1
2h1
+
"
~q2g   (1  s)2
2(1  s)h2
#
~z (13e)
Using (11a) and (11b) in (13a)-(13d), we can solve for the steady-state values of ~z; ~r; ~qk; and
~qg. Substituting these values in the aggregate resource constraint (13e) immediately yields the
steady-state level of the consumption-capital ratio, ~c.12
3.2 Optimal Fiscal Policy
In a decentralized economy with private provision of all factors of production and externalities,
maximizing economic welfare might be an important objective for the government. This optimal
policy intervention is attained by choosing the appropriate set of tax and subsidy (expenditure)
rates (^y; ^ b; s^) that ensures an equilibrium allocation that replicates a centrally planned economy.
The central planners allocation is always the "rst-best," since all externalities are internalized
ex-ante. To characterize optimal scal policy in the decentralized economy, we will rst describe
the central planners equilibrium resource allocation.
The relevant production function for the central planner is given by
Y = A(ukK)
 "(ugKg)1 ( ")  A(ukK)(ugKg)1  (14)
12The linearized dynamics corresponding to this steady state can be described as _X = 

X   ~X

, where X 0 =
(z; qk; qg); ~X
0 = (~z; ~qk; ~qg), and  represents the 3x3 coe¢ cient matrix of the linearized system. It can be veried
that the equilibrium is a saddle path with one stable (negative) and two unstable (positive) eigenvalues.
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Note that in (14), the centrally planned economy is not subject to congestion, since the planner
takes into account (2b) and (2c). Moreover, the e¤ect of the aggregate production externality (")
is also internalized by the planner. The central planner maximizes (1), subject to the aggregate
resource constraint (8) and the accumulation equations (3a) and (3b), given the production function
in (14). Denoting all equilibrium variables in the centrally planned economy with a superscript
"", the optimal capital utilization rates are given by
uk =
"
1
(z)(g 1)(1 )
(qk)
g+ 1(qg)1 
# 1

(15a)
ug =
"
2
(z)(1 k)
(qk)(qg)k 
# 1

(15b)
where  =    ", 1 = g+ 1(1  )1 Ag , and 2 = (1  )k Ak :
The corresponding steady-state conditions for a centrally planned economy are
~qg   1
h2
  g(~ug) =
~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (16a)
(1 + ~vg^)A (~uk)
  ~ug1  (~z)1 
~qk
+
(~qk   1)2
2h1~qk
  k(~uk) = ~r (16b)
(1 + ~vg^) (1  )A (~uk)
 
~ug
1 
(~z) 
~qg
+
(~qg   1)2
2h2~qg
  g(~ug) = ~r (16c)
~r   
1   =
~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (16d)
In (16b) and (16c), g^ represents the fraction of output allocated to infrastructure investment by the
central planner, and ~v denotes the corresponding shadow value (resource cost) of this allocation.
In the case where the central planner chooses this fraction endogenously (optimally), ~v = 0:
To derive optimal scal policy in the decentralized economy, we compare the steady-state re-
lationships (13a)-(13d), with the corresponding relationships in the centrally planned economy,
(16a)-(16d), assuming that the central planner sets g^ optimally (so that ~v = 0 in (16b) and (16c)).
This enables us to solve for the optimal rates for the scal instruments in the decentralized economy:
^ b = 0 (17a)
^y =
"+ (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) (17b)
s^ =
1
1 + !
(17c)
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where
! =
~q2g
2h2A (~uk=~z~ug)
 e ["+ (1  )^y]
The optimal tax on bond income, given by (17a), must be zero as there are no capital market
imperfections. The optimal tax on income, ^y, given in (17b), takes into account the e¤ect of both
the congestion and the aggregate production externality. To see this, consider the case where there
is no congestion, but the aggregate production externality is positive, i.e.,  = 1 and " > 0: In
that case,
^y =
"

(17a)
(17a) implies that even without congestion, the optimal income tax rate must be positive. The
intuition behind this result is that the actual output elasticity of private capital is (   "), but
the private agent internalizes only . Therefore, the optimal tax rate on capital income enables
the agent to internalize the negative e¤ect of ", while adjusting it by , which has already been
internalized ex-ante. When " = 0; but congestion is present (0 <  < 1), we get the result familiar
from much of the existing literature; see Turnovsky (1997).
The optimal tax rates described in (17a) and (17b) are, however, insu¢ cient to attain the
rst-best resource allocation, because both externalities a¤ect the usage and accumulation of
infrastructure as well, which in turn requires an additional corrective scal instrument. This is
given by the optimal infrastructure subsidy in (17c), which takes into account not only the aggregate
production externality ", but also the equilibrium factor utilization rates and the shadow price of
infrastructure, all of which crucially determine its services. Further, though the government has
access to non-distortionary sources of nancing, the optimal infrastructure subsidy must be partially
nanced by income tax revenues. This makes intuitive sense, since an income tax a¤ects the returns
from both factors of production. More simply, even though the optimal income tax rate is designed
to control for the externalities generated by private capital accumulation, it also a¤ects the marginal
return and usage of infrastructure capital. Therefore, a part of the tax revenues collected by the
government are rebated back to the private sector through the infrastructure subsidy.
4 Government Provision of Infrastructure
We now consider a decentralized economy where the entire stock of infrastructure is provided
by the government. Consequently, infrastructure services are non-excludable and the private agent
takes its stock as exogenously given in making allocation decisions. However, production is still
subject to the two externalities and is given by
Y = A (uKK)
1 (1 ) (ugKg)1 +" ( K)( 1)(1 ) " (18)
Note that, since the government directly provides infrastructure capital, we set Kg = ugKg
at the outset. Also, since the agent treats Kg as exogenously given, it does not internalize the
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utilization rate, ug, and its e¤ect on depreciation. As a result, the agent treats infrastructure
depreciation as an exogenous constant, g = g; for all t. The immediate consequence of this
is that the marginal cost of infrastructure utilization is zero for the private agent. This implies
that the rate of infrastructure utilization will also be treated by the private agent as an exogenous
constant, i.e., ug = ug, for all t (0 < ug  1). This is the key behavioral di¤erence between this
regime and the privatized one described in section 3.
The corresponding private ow budget constraint is given by
_b = (1   b) rb+ (1  y)Y   C     (I;K)  T (19)
The governments budget constraint is now given by
_b = (1   b) rb+
(G;Kg)  yY   T (19b)
Note that since the government provides infrastructure capital, its installation costs do not enter
(19b). The aggregate resource constraint continues to be given by (8).
The private agent maximizes (1), subject to (19a) and (3a), given (4a), (5a), and (18). As
in section 3, we have normalized N = 1 and set K = ukK (ex-post) in deriving the equilibrium
conditions:
C 1 =  (20a)
  
_

= (1   b)r (20b)
A(1  y) [1  (1  )]

ugKg
K
1 ( ") uk  1
qk
= u
k 1
k (20c)
i  I
K
=
qk   1
h1
(20d)
_qk
qk
+
A(1  y) [1  (1  )]uk  (ugKg=K)1 ( )
qk
+
(qk   1)2
2h1qk
  k (uk) = (1   b)r (20e)
The interpretation of the optimality conditions (20a)-(20e) is analogous to those in section
3. However, there are some key di¤erences in the structure of the equilibrium. First, since the
infrastructure utilization rate is exogenous to the private agent, a condition analogous to (9c) is
now absent. Second, the evolution of the shadow price of infrastructure (qg) is not internalized by
the private agent and therefore is not part of the macroeconomic equilibrium.
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The evolution of the government-provided stock of infrastructure capital is given by (3b). To
maintain an equilibrium of sustained growth, the government must spend a xed fraction of aggre-
gate output on infrastructure investment:
_Kg = G  gKg; G = gY; 0 < g < 1 (3b)
where g is government spending on infrastructure investment, as a fraction of aggregate output.
Given the governments budget constraint in (19b), this expenditure can be nanced through a
variety of policy instruments, such as income and lump-sum taxes, as well as government debt.
Recalling (9e), an interesting di¤erence between the private and government provision model is
that while g is constrained to be a constant fraction under government provision, it is time-varying
under private provision, evolving with the shadow price of infrastructure and its average product
along the transition path to the steady-state equilibrium.
4.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
The basic structure of the macro-dynamic equilibrium remains similar to section 3. However,
the equilibrium is now described in terms of z; c, and qk only, and is independent of the shadow
price of infrastructure, qg. The rate of utilization of private capital can be derived from (19c):
uk  uk (qk; z) =
"
A f1  (1  )g (1  y) (ugz)1 
qk
# 1
k 
(21)
Comparing (21) with its counterpart (11a) under private provision, we see that the choice of private
capital utilization in this regime depends only on the shadow price of private capital and the ratio
of infrastructure to private capital, but is independent of the shadow price of infrastructure as well
as its utilization rate (since ug is a constant).
The core equilibrium dynamics are given by
_z
z

_Kg
Kg
 
_K
K
= gAuk u
1 
g z
    g  

qk   1
h1
  k(uk)

(22a)
_qk
qk
= (1   b)r  
A(1  y) [1  (1  )]uku1 g z1 
qk
  (qk   1)
2
2h1qk
+ k (uk) (22b)
where uk is given by (21) and  =    ", as before. The evolution of the consumption-private
capital ratio is given by
_c
c

_C
C
 
_K
K
=

(1   b)r   
1  

 

qk   1
h1
  k(uk)

(22c)
The economy will attain its balanced growth steady-state equilibrium when _z = _c = _qk = 0.
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The corresponding steady-state conditions are
gA~uk u
1 
g ~z
    g = ~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (23a)
(1   b)~r   
1   =
~qk   1
h1
  k(~uk) (23b)
A(1  y) [1  (1  )] ~uku1 g ~z1 
qk
+
(~qk   1)2
2h1~qk
  k (~uk) = (1   b)~r (23c)
Equations (23a)-(23c) can be solved for ~z; ~qk;and ~r. Given this solution, ~c can be determined from
the the economys aggregate resource constraint:13
(1  g)A~uk u1 g ~z1  = ~c+
~q2k   1
2h1
+
h2
2

g(A~uk u
1 
g ~z
1 )

~z
2
(23d)
4.2 Optimal Fiscal Policy
Under government provision of infrastructure, the burden of replicating the central planners
allocation falls entirely on the tax system. Comparing (23a)-(23c) with (16a)-(16c), we see that
the optimal tax on bond income must be zero as before, i.e., ^ b = 0. This implies that the income
tax rate must correct for the two externalities in the steady-state equilibrium:
^y =
"+ (1  ) (1  )  (   ") ~vg
1   (1  ) (24)
Comparing (24) with (17a), its counterpart in the privatized economy, we see that the steady-state
optimal tax on income di¤ers across the two regimes of infrastructure provision. This happens be-
cause under direct government provision of infrastructure, the allocation of output to infrastructure
investment, g, is arbitrary and therefore may be above, below, or equal to its social optimum, g^.
Hence the term (   ") ~vg in (24) corrects for this deviation, with ~v denoting the shadow value of
allocating an extra unit of output to infrastructure investment, as described in section 3.2. There-
fore, when g < g^, we must have ~v > 0, and the optimal tax rate is smaller than in the privatized
economy. This encourages private capital accumulation which, by increasing the ow of output,
increases the stock of infrastructure towards its socially optimal level. On the other hand, when
g > g^, we must have ~v < 0, as the stock of infrastructure is too large relative to the social optimum.
As a result, the optimal tax rate is larger than in the privatized economy. Finally, when g = g^,
infrastructure investment is at its social optimum and ~v = 0. In this case, the optimal income tax,
in the steady state, is exactly identical across regimes.
13The linearized dynamics corresponding to this steady state can be described as _J = 

J   ~J

, where J 0 =
(z; qk); ~J
0 = (~z; ~qk), and  represents the 2x2 coe¢ cient matrix of the linearized system. The equilibrium is
characterized by a saddle path with one stable and one unstable eigenvalue.
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However, one important caveat to this result distinguishes itself from the design of optimal scal
policy in the privatized economy. If the government sets ^y according to (24), the adjustment path
followed by the decentralized economy will fail to replicate that of its centrally planned counterpart.
This happens because when the government provides the entire stock of infrastructure, the private
agent takes it as exogenously given and therefore does not internalize (i) the e¤ect of its private
investment decisions on the implied shadow price of infrastructure and (ii) the utilization and
depreciation rates of infrastructure capital and their consequences for the corresponding choices
for private capital, along the transition path. This behavioral aspect leads to an externality in
private resource allocation in the transition to the steady-state equilibrium. As a result, a constant
income tax rate cannot account for this transitional externality, and the economy converges to the
rst-best steady-state equilibrium at a non-optimal rate relative to the centrally planned economy.
Therefore, ^y is the rst-best tax rate only in the steady state, but not in transition.
This problem, however, can be corrected by a time-varying income tax rate, which takes the
following form:
y (t) = ^y +  [z(t)  ~z] (25)
The income tax rate in (25) tracks the dynamic evolution of the economy as the ratio of infrastruc-
ture to private capital changes in transition, thereby enabling the private agent to track the dynamic
adjustment of the shadow price of infrastructure as well as its utilization rate.14
Comparing (17a)-(17c) with (24) and (25), we see that the mode of infrastructure provision
(private or public) generates fundamental di¤erences with respect to the design of optimal scal
policy. While the optimal income tax and expenditure (subsidy) rates in a privatized economy
are constant throughout transition, the optimal income tax rate under government provision must
be time-varying until it reaches the steady-state equilibrium. These di¤erences highlight the
subtle, but crucial di¤erences between the two regimes regarding the degree to which the various
interdependencies between private capital and infrastructure are internalized by the private sector
along the transition path to the long-run equilibrium.
5 Private versus Government Provision: A Numerical Analysis
We begin by numerically characterizing the benchmark steady-state equilibrium, where there
are no congestion or production externalities, i.e.,  = 1 and " = 0. Our starting point is the
laissez-faire economy where both private capital and infrastructure are privately provided. Given
14The accurate determination of the constant  is crucial for the rst-best tax policy to replicate the dynamic
adjustment of a centrally planned economy. To ensure this, the government must set  such that F (; ) = V () = 0,
where F (:) and V (:) are polynomials derived from the determinants of the linearized matrix of coe¢ cients in the
centrally planned and decentralized economies, respectively, while  is the stable eigenvalue in the centrally planned
economy. When  is chosen in this way, the speed of adjustment in the decentralized economy will replicate that
of the centrally planned economy. Moreover,  is only relevant along the transition path, and does not a¤ect the
steady-state equilibrium. As z(t) ! ~z, y (t) will converge to its long-run optimal rate, ^y. For a more elaborate
proof, albeit in a di¤erent context, see Turnovsky (1997).
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the allocation under laissez-faire, we calibrate an economy where infrastructure is provided by
the government, which the private sector takes as exogenously given in making its own allocation
decisions. The structural and policy parameters we choose for our calibration are outlined below:
Preference Parameters:  =  1:5,  = 0:04
Production Parameters: A = 1:5;  = 0:8; h1 = h2 = 15;
k = g = 2
Externality Parameters:  2 [0; 1], " 2 [0; 0:2]
Policy Parameters: y = 0;  b = 0; s = 0
The structural parameters have been chosen to be consistent with their corresponding empirical
estimates. For example, the preference parameters  and  yield an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption equal to 0.4, consistent with the ndings of Ogaki and Reinhart (1998).
The output elasticity of private capital () is set at 0.8, which is reasonable when we dene private
capital as an amalgam of physical and human capital, as in Romer (1986). This also implies that
the corresponding elasticity for infrastructure is 0.2, which is within the empirically estimated range
of 0:1  0:3; see Gramlich (1994). The adjustment cost parameters are consistent with Ortiguera
and Santos (1997) and their equality serves as a plausible benchmark. While A represents a scale
parameter in the production function, the choice of k, the elasticity of depreciation with respect
to private capital utilization is set at 2, following Basu and Kimball (1997).15 Since there is no
known estimate for the corresponding elasticity with respect to infrastructure capital, g, we set
it equal to k. We vary the congestion parameter (), from 0 (proportional congestion) to 1 (no
congestion), while the production externality (") is varied from 0 to 0.2, as in Chatterjee and
Turnovsky (2006). We set the tax and subsidy rates to zero in the laissez-faire economy, while
under government provision we assume that the necessary public expenditure on infrastructure is
nanced by appropriately adjusting lump-sum taxes or government debt.
In comparing the two regimes of infrastructure provision, we must start from a common bench-
mark equilibrium across the two regimes. To achieve this outcome, we note that in the government
provision regime, (i) spending on infrastructure (g), represents an arbitrary policy choice, and (ii)
the utilization and depreciation rates for infrastructure capital (ug and g) are exogenous constants.
Therefore, we calibrate these variables in the government provision economy to equal the corre-
sponding equilibrium values in the private provision (laissez-faire) regime. Table 1A, therefore,
depicts the common benchmark equilibrium in the laissez-faire and government provision economies.
Since there are no externalities in this equilibrium ( = 1 and " = 0), and the income tax and
subsidy parameters are set to zero, this outcome can be viewed as the "rst-best." The equilib-
rium ratio of infrastructure to private capital (z) is 0.25, while the shadow prices of infrastructure
15There have been a few attempts in the literature to measure the elasticity parameter , and the ones available
show signicant variation. For example, Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) estimate k = 1:56 for U.S. manufacturing,
while Finns (1995) estimate is 1.44. More recently, Dalgaard (2003) calculates k to be about 1.7 for Denmark.
Basu and Kimball (1997) note that the upper bound of the 95 percent condence interval for k is 2.
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and private capital are equalized at 2.42.16 The steady-state interest rate is 9.85 percent, while
the consumption-private capital ratio (c) is 0.23. The equilibrium utilization and depreciation
rates for private capital and infrastructure in the laissez-faire economy are also equal at 0.38 and
7 percent, respectively. The corresponding variables in the government provision economy are
calibrated to equal those in the laissez-faire economy. Table 1B reports the equilibrium fractions
of output devoted to consumption, private capital and infrastructure, as well as the steady-state
growth rate and relative welfare levels in the two regimes. The consumption-output ratio is 0.53,
while the allocation to private investment is about 22 percent. This, in turn, leads to a private
capital-output ratio of 2.34. In the laissez faire economy, the private agent allocates 5.5 percent
of output to infrastructure investment in equilibrium. The corresponding expenditure in the gov-
ernment provision economy is an arbitrary policy choice and is therefore set to equal the allocation
in the laissez faire economy. These equilibrium allocations imply that both economies grow at the
common rate of 2.34 percent in the long run and have exactly the same level of welfare.17 The
coincidence of the long-run equilibria in the two models of infrastructure provision provides us with
a convenient starting point for analyzing the relationship between scal policy and macroeconomic
performance in the two regimes.18
Table 2 shows the impact of the two externalities ( and ") on equilibrium growth and welfare.
For the purpose of comparison, we report the results relative to the equilibrium in the benchmark
economy ( where  = 1 and " = 0). For example, when  = 0:5 and " = 0:1; the equilibrium
growth rate (identical in the two regimes) is 9 percent below the benchmark level (	=~	 = 0:91)
and welfare is 38 percent below the benchmark level (W= ~W = 0:62). From Table 2, we see that
for any given value of the production externality ("), an increase in congestion ( decreases from
1 toward 0), raises equilibrium growth and lowers welfare relative to the benchmark equilibrium.
This happens because with higher congestion, the return to private investment increases above its
social optimum for any given stock of infrastructure, by increasing the underlying services derived
from it. This leads to higher private investment and growth relative to the benchmark. The higher
investment implies that fewer resources are devoted to consumption, leading to lower equilibrium
welfare. On the other hand, for a given level of congestion, an increase in " lowers the impact of the
aggregate production externality, given by ~z", since 0 < ~z < 1 and 0 < " < 1.19 Since z = Kg=K,
the aggregate productivity benet from infrastructure falls relative to private capital, causing the
private agent to shift more resources into private investment. Since the stock of private capital
was larger than the stock of infrastructure to begin with (~z < 1), this substitution is subject to
16Note that in the government provision economy, the shadow price of infrastructure, qg, does not apply, since the
private agent takes the government-provided stock as exogenously given.
17Welfare is calculated by numerically integrating the intertemporal utility function (1), where C(t) is evaluated
along its equilibrium path.
18Since we have set our benchmark tax and subsidy rates to zero, our results should be viewed as a numerical
illustration of the analytical framework developed in sections 2-4, rather than a calibration for a particular economy.
However, most of the equilibrium values lie within their corresponding ranges for the OECD countries, as reviewed
by Morshed and Turnovsky (2004).
19The equilibrium magnitude of z is invariant to changes in ", because the private returns to both infrastructure
and private capital are always equal in equilibrium, and " is external to the agents allocation problem.
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diminishing returns, which lowers both growth and welfare relative to the benchmark equilibrium.
5.1 Fiscal Policy, Externalities, and Transitional Dynamics
This section considers the e¤ects of scal policies on equilibrium allocation and welfare in the
two regimes of infrastructure provision. In particular, we focus on the two scal instruments that
have a direct impact on the incentives to invest: the infrastructure subsidy (s) and the income
tax rate (y).20 We compare the e¤ects of these instruments numerically by considering three
policy experiments: (i) a targeted infrastructure subsidy to private providers versus an equivalent
increase in public investment under government provision, both nanced by lump-sum taxation, (ii)
experiment (i), but when spending is nanced by a distortionary income tax, and (iii) an increase
in the income tax rate. The corresponding results are reported in Tables 3-4 and gure 1.21 As
we will see in the subsequent sections, though the two regimes start with identical equilibrium
allocations, scal policy shocks lead to distinct di¤erences in their responses, which ultimately
generate substantial di¤erences in long-run welfare levels.
5.1.1 Infrastructure Subsidy versus Government Investment
Tables 3A and 3B report the long-run response to an increase in the infrastructure subsidy
rate in the private provision regime with an increase in public spending on infrastructure in the
government provision regime. To compare the responses of the two regimes to these policy shocks,
we calibrate the increase in public investment under government provision to equal the increase
in infrastructure investment under private provision (generated by the subsidy). The di¤erence
between Tables 3A and 3B is in the mode of nancing the underlying investment in infrastructure:
in Table 3A, the spending is nanced by a lump-sum tax, while in Table 3B the nancing instrument
is the distortionary income tax.22
Under lump-sum tax nancing (Table 3A), an infrastructure subsidy to private providers drives a
wedge between the returns to the two capital stocks by lowering the cost of infrastructure investment
and raising its market (shadow) price (qg) relative to that of private capital (qk).23 This generates
a long-run increase in the allocation of output to infrastructure relative to private capital, reected
by an increase in G=Y and a decline in I=Y . The higher return to infrastructure also increases
its rate of utilization. Consequently, this raises the productivity of private capital and its rate of
20Since the optimal tax on interest income is zero (from 17b), we set ^ b = 0 throughout our calibration exercises.
21Since both economies have a common pre-shock equilibrium, we report the long-run changes in each variable
following an underlying scal shock. Therefore, if x is an endogenous variable, we report dx = x1   x0, where x1 is
the after-shock steady-state equilibrium value of x and x0 is its pre-shock level. The changes in the growth rates are
reported as percentages.
22We introduce a comparison between lump-sum and distortionary tax-nancing of the subsidy and government
investment to relate our results to the previous literature, namely Devarajan et al. (1998) and Chatterjee (2006),
who consider only the e¤ects of a distortionary nancing instrument (income tax).
23Note here that since the infrastructure subsidy is tied to the cost of public investment (and not output), we
calibrate s = 0:5 so that a subsidy that nances 50 percent of the cost of infrastructure investment equals about 10
percent of GDP.
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utilization as well. The increase in the rates of accumulation and utilization of the two capital
stocks raises the equilibrium growth rate and increases the ow of output in a proportion larger
than consumption (reected by a decline in the consumption-output ratio).
Under government provision, however, an equivalent increase in public spending (g) raises the
total cost of infrastructure investment, since the accumulation of infrastructure is subject to instal-
lation costs that must also be nanced by the government. As a result, there is a larger crowding
out of private investment and consumption relative to the privatized economy, as the government
uses the economys resources in accumulating and installing infrastructure. In fact, the fall in
the consumption-output ratio is indeed very large relative to that in the privatized economy. On
the other hand, the large amount of resources devoted by the government to infrastructure (new
investment and installation costs) raises the growth rate more than that under private provision.
When the mode of nancing is changed to the distortionary income tax (Table 3B), the above
mechanisms remain qualitatively the same. However, since the income tax used to nance the
subsidy under private provision lowers the after-tax marginal return on both types of capital, the
crowding out of private investment is larger and the increase in infrastructure investment smaller
than under lump-sum tax nancing. The lower after-tax marginal return on the two types of capital
causes a large substitution in favor of consumption, which leads to an increase in the consumption-
output ratio. Since the higher income tax is being used to nance infrastructure investment,
it causes modest increases in the rates of utilization and long-run growth. Under government
provision, since infrastructure is publicly provided, the extent of crowding out of private investment
is smaller, thereby leading to a more expansionary e¤ect on the growth rate than under private
provision.
Transitional Dynamics
The dynamic adjustment in the two regimes in response to a subsidy and an increase in
government investment is illustrated in gure 1(panels A and B, respectively).
The transitional dynamics in the two economies are dramatically di¤erent, although their long-
run responses are qualitatively similar. In the private provision model, an increase in the subsidy
to infrastructure generates a huge increase in expected long-run productivity. However, since the
stock of infrastructure capital cannot be changed instantaneously, the agent responds by increasing
the rate of its utilization, ug. As a result, ug jumps up instantaneously to overshoot its higher
long-run equilibrium (g. 1Ai). The higher expected long-run stock of infrastructure also raises
the expected long-run productivity of private capital, causing its rate of utilization, uk, to jump up
as well, but by less than the jump in ug, to maintain equality in their respective rates of return.
Thereafter, as infrastructure is accumulated, its average product falls and ug gradually declines and
approaches its new steady-state equilibrium rate from above. At the same time, the rising stock of
infrastructure raises the productivity of private capital, and uk increases in transition to approach
its new (common) equilibrium rate from below. In the new steady-state equilibrium, both capital
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stocks have the same rates of utilization. In contrast, in the government provision model, the
private agent cannot alter the utilization rate of infrastructure, since it is exogenous to private
decisions. As a result, ug in the government provision model remains unchanged throughout
transition. The higher government spending therefore leads to a slight downward jump in the
utilization rate for private capital (g. 1Bi). Thereafter, as infrastructure is accumulated, the
positive productivity e¤ect on private capital raises its utilization rate gradually to its new, higher
steady-state equilibrium.
Figures 1A and B (ii) illustrate the dynamic response of the private investment-output ratio in
the two regimes. In the private provision model, the increase in infrastructure investment due to the
subsidy requires a substitution away from private capital investment, leading to an instantaneous
decline in I=Y . The large investment boom causes output to grow at a much faster rate than
private capital in transition, causing the private investment-output ratio to gradually decline to
its lower after-shock equilibrium level. In the government provision model, the appropriation of
private resources for infrastructure investment by the government (due to installation costs) causes
the agent to increase its allocation to private investment to maintain the ow of output. This causes
an initial upward jump in I=Y . Thereafter, as public capital accumulates, output grows much
faster than private capital, and the investment-output ratio falls sharply to its lower steady-state
equilibrium.
The responses of the consumption-private capital and consumption-output ratios are depicted
in gures 1A and B (iii)-(iv). Again, we see that the dynamic responses across the two regimes
are dramatically di¤erent. In the private provision economy, the higher long-run productivity of
private capital (due to infrastructure accumulation and higher utilization) causes the consumption-
capital and the consumption-output ratios to increase instantaneously. Thereafter, the investment
boom causes output to increase at a rate higher than consumption, so that the consumption-output
ratio falls in transition. On the other hand, the large increase in output permits the growth rate
of consumption to exceed that of private capital, so that the consumption-capital ratio increases in
transition. In the government provision model, consumption is crowded out instantaneously as the
agent tries to o¤set the higher spending by the government by substituting away from consumption
into private investment. This is shown by the large downward jumps of the consumption-capital
and consumption-output ratios. Thereafter, the growth in output and private capital (due to
infrastructure investment by the government) causes these ratios to increase over time, indicating
that the benets of investment and growth are reallocated somewhat back to consumption during
transition to make up for the large initial decline.
5.1.2 An Income Tax Increase
Table 3C reports the long-run e¤ects of a 10 percent increase in the income tax rate across
the two regimes, from its benchmark rate of y = 0 to 0:1. In general, an increase in the tax on
income will reduce the after-tax returns on both private capital and infrastructure in the privatized
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economy. This leads to a substitution away from investment in both types of capital towards
consumption. As a result, the consumption-output ratio increases, while the allocations to the
two types of investment fall. The allocation to private investment declines more than the one to
infrastructure because, given their respective output elasticities, private investment has a larger
initial share in output. On the other hand, the lower after-tax marginal product of the two capital
stocks causes the private agent to lower the respective utilization rates (uk and ug) which, by
reducing depreciation costs, partially o¤sets the decline in investment. Overall, the decumulation
of the two capital stocks and their lower utilization lead to a decline in the long-run equilibrium
growth rate.
In the economy where the government provides the entire stock of infrastructure, the private
agent cannot alter investment in infrastructure or its utilization. Since these variables are exoge-
nous to the private agent, the burden of adjustment falls entirely on the stock of private capital.
As a result, the decline in the private investment-output ratio is larger than in the privatized econ-
omy. However, since the government maintains its rate of investment in infrastructure (unlike the
privatized economy, where it declines), the decline in productivity of private capital is less than
that under private provision. Consequently, the reduction in the rate of utilization of private cap-
ital is also less than that in the privatized economy. This implies a smaller substitution towards
consumption, and consequently, a smaller decline in the equilibrium growth rate relative to the
privatized economy.
Transitional Dynamics (or the Lack of It)
In contrast to the e¤ects of tax shocks in models with xed depreciation and capital uti-
lization rates (where typically uk = ug = 1), there is little or no dynamic adjustment when these
variables are endogenous. For example, in the private provision regime, the income tax shock
does not generate any dynamic adjustment and the economy immediately jumps to its after-shock
steady-state equilibrium. This is a surprising result, since traditionally models with multiple cap-
ital stocks display slow adjustment to tax shocks; see Futagami et al. (1993). However, when
one considers the role of capital utilization and depreciation in resource allocation, this result is
not di¢ cult to rationalize. Since the utilization decisions provide the agent an extra margin along
which the ow of output can be maintained, the ratio of public to private capital, z, remains in-
variant to a tax increase. This happens because, on the margin, the tax shock a¤ects the returns
to either type of capital symmetrically. Also, the no-arbitrage conditions (9g) and (9h) imply that
the after-tax equality in the return to both types of capital must be maintained at all points of
time. This is ensured as the agent, in response to the tax increase, reallocates resources away from
investment in the two capital goods and readjusts their respective utilization rates to maintain z
at a constant level. Therefore, although the equilibrium allocations and the growth rate change,
the e¤ect of the tax increase on the economy is instantaneous. In the government provision model,
since one adjustment margin is not available to the agent (infrastructure investment and its uti-
lization), a tax shock does generate a dynamic response, but the adjustment is very quick as the
22
agent appropriately adjusts the utilization rate of private capital. Therefore, we have chosen only
to discuss the qualitative nature of the dynamics, but not illustrate them graphically.
5.1.3 Welfare E¤ects of Fiscal Shocks and the Role of Capital Utilization
One crucial norm for comparing the relative performance of the two regimes of infrastructure
provision is the response of economic welfare to underlying changes in scal instruments. It is
also instructive to check the robustness of the welfare responses to variations in the externality
parameters. We conduct these exercises for the subsidy and government spending increase in
Tables 4A and 4B, and the income tax increase in Table 4C .
The rst thing to note about Tables 4A-B is that a targeted subsidy to private providers of
infrastructure yields uniformly higher welfare gains than an equivalent increase in government in-
vestment, irrespective of whether the nancing instrument is a lump-sum tax or an income tax.
This comparison is also robust to changes in either the congestion or production externality pa-
rameters. This is a signicant result, since it has been generally thought that if the government
has access to lump-sum taxes, the choice between private and public provision of infrastructure is
irrelevant (in terms of the impact on welfare); see Devarajan et al. (1998). However, our results
indicate that even with lump-sum taxes and debt-nancing at its disposal, the government can-
not outperform the private sector in the context of infrastructure provision. Much of the earlier
analysis of this issue has relied heavily on the asymmetric distortions created by the income tax in
nancing infrastructure investment in the two regimes . Our results indicate that one must look
beyond tax distortions to explain the inherent di¤erences between the two modes of infrastructure
provision. The intuition can instead be drawn from the behavioral di¤erences between the two
regimes, such as the asymmetric response of capital utilization decisions to the underlying scal
policy shocks.
Under private provision, the subsidy lowers the cost of infrastructure investment and increases
the rates of utilization of both the capital stocks. The resultant ow of output is therefore much
higher than under government provision, where the private agent cannot alter the rate of in-
frastructure utilization to its advantage. Moreover, an increase in direct government spending
on infrastructure increases installation costs, which leads to a larger crowding out of private con-
sumption under government provision. On the other hand, the ability to control the allocation
of resources to the two capital stocks by adjusting their rates of utilization requires a smaller ad-
justment in consumption in the privatized economy. These behavioral responses lead to dramatic
di¤erences in welfare levels across the two regimes. For example, in Table 4A, when there are no
externalities ( = 1 and " = 0), the welfare gain from a lump-sum tax-nanced subsidy to private
providers is 29.57 percent, while that from an equivalent increase in government investment is only
1.52 percent. In fact, when " = 0, an increase in congestion leads to increasing welfare losses un-
der government provision, while there are increasing gains under private provision. This happens
because, when congestion is higher, the substitution away from consumption under government
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provision is also higher, as the agent accumulates more private capital in order to increase the ser-
vices from the stock of infrastructure. Therefore, infrastructure accumulation under government
provision makes the e¤ects of congestion worse, reducing welfare in the long run. In contrast, a
subsidy in the private provision model causes a smaller substitution away from consumption into
private investment, as the agent can adjust both the capital utilization rates to derive the necessary
services from infrastructure. This lowers the adverse e¤ects of congestion and makes the economy
better o¤. Since a subsidy increases the stock of infrastructure relative to private capital (z), an
increase in " now has a larger productivity impact on the economy, and the welfare gains from
infrastructure investment in both regimes increase, although the privatized economy still yields
much higher welfare gains than the government provision economy.
When the two economies are subject to an income tax shock (Table 4C), the comparisons in
Tables 4A and 4B are now reversed : the economy under government provision yields uniformly
higher welfare gains or lower welfare losses relative to the privatized economy. This happens
because a tax shock is more contractionary for the privatized economy. By reducing the after-tax
return on both private capital and infrastructure, a tax shock leads not only to lower aggregate
investment in the privatized economy, but also to lower utilization rates for both capital stocks.
As a result, the ow of output declines, yielding only modest welfare changes. In comparison, a
tax increase under government provision reduces only the return and utilization of private capital.
Moreover, since the government maintains its infrastructure investment rate, the resultant fall in
output is partially o¤set. This leads to higher welfare gains or lower losses than under private
provision. For example, when  = 1 and " = 0 in Table 4C, a 10 percent increase in the income
tax rate lowers welfare by 0.88 percent in the privatized economy, while the corresponding loss
under government provision is 0.53 percent. Therefore, an income tax is more distortionary in the
private provision model than under government provision. As the level of congestion increases, a tax
increase under government provision has a larger positive impact than under private provision, since
the government, by maintaining its expenditure on infrastructure, ensures that the corresponding
services derived by the private agent are una¤ected. An increase in the production externality
increases the welfare gains in both regimes, but again, the government provision model performs
better. Interestingly, this result is exactly the opposite to that of Devarajan et al. (1998), where
tax distortions are higher under government provision. Endogenous utilization decisions, therefore,
serve as the crucial link between our results and those in the literature.
The welfare comparisons provided in Table 4 suggest that the desirability of private and gov-
ernment provision regimes depends not on structural parameters or distortions created by the tax
system (lump-sum versus distortionary), but rather on the private sectors ability to internalize
capital utilization rates in response to scal shocks, and its consequences for resource allocation.
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6 Conclusions
Though infrastructure provision has recently become a contentious issue in policy circles, it
has received very little formal attention from economists. This paper builds on a very small but
promising literature and attempts to provide some insights into the choice between private and
government provision and its impact on an economys aggregate performance. We distinguish our
work from the existing literature by focussing on the behavioral aspects of excludability (or the lack
of it) in the accumulation and usage of infrastructure. Specically, by introducing both private
and infrastructure capital utilization as decision variables, we have illustrated how the mode of
infrastructure provision a¤ects the degree to which these decisions are internalized and how, in
turn, they a¤ect an economys response to scal shocks. We also show that the choice between
private and public provision matters even when the government has access to lump-sum taxes or
other non-distortionary scal instruments. If the government wants to stimulate investment in
infrastructure, then a subsidy to private providers yields signicantly higher welfare gains than an
equivalent increase in direct government investment, irrespective of the mode of nancing. By
contrast, the e¤ects of an income tax are more distortionary under private provision than under
government provision. Our comparisons are robust to di¤erent aspects of rivalry in infrastructure
provision, like congestion and aggregate production externalities. The robustness of our results to
nancing instruments and structural parameters represents a signicant departure from previous
work in this area.
The mode of infrastructure provision also has an important bearing on the design of optimal
scal policy. While under private provision, both an (constant) income tax and an infrastructure
subsidy are jointly required to attain the rst-best equilibrium, under government provision the
burden of attaining optimality falls on the income tax alone, which in turn needs to be time-
varying. Since the private agent treats the underlying stock of infrastructure as exogenous, it
fails to internalize the e¤ect of private capital accumulation and usage on the implied utilization
rate and shadow price of infrastructure. A time-varying income tax rate is thus required to track
these variables for the agent. Therefore, the mode of infrastructure provision and the consequent
behavioral di¤erences play a critical role in determining the relationship between scal policy and
macroeconomic performance in a growing economy.
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TABLE 1
Benchmark Equilibrium in the Laissez-faire and Government Provision Models
( = 1; " = 0)
1A. Equilibrium Variables
z qj r (%) c uj j
0:25 2:42 9:85 0:23 0:38 0:07
1B. Equilibrium Ratios, Growth, and Welfare
C=Y I=Y K=Y G=Y ~	 (%) ~Wi= ~WL
0:53 0:22 2:34 0:055 2:34 1
Note: (a) j = k; g and (b) i = G (Government Provision), L (Laissez-faire/Private
Provision)
TABLE 2
Sensitivity of Equilibrium Growth and Welfare to Externalities
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
	=~	 W= ~W 	=~	 W= ~W 	=~	 W= ~W
" = 0 1:32 0:88 1:16 0:95 1 1
" = 0:1 1:03 0:56 0:91 0:62 0:78 0:68
" = 0:2 0:78 0:36 0:68 0:41 0:59 0:46
Note: 	=~	 = Equilibrium growth rate relative to benchmark growth rate ( = 1; " = 0)
W= ~W = Equilibrium welfare relative to benchmark welfare ( = 1; " = 0)
TABLE 3
Private versus Government Provision of Infrastructure: Steady-State E¤ects of
Fiscal Shocks
( = 1, " = 0)
A. Subsidy to Private Providers versus Government Spending (Lump-sum Tax-Financed )
d(C=Y ) d(I=Y ) d(G=Y ) duk dug d	
Private Provision Model  0:18  1:20 +4:91 +2:14 +2:14 +0:57
Government Provision Model  8:99  1:24 +4:91 +2:23   +0:59
B. Subsidy to Private Providers versus Government Spending (Income Tax-Financed )
d(C=Y ) d(I=Y ) d(G=Y ) duk dug d	
Private Provision Model +3:93  2:26 +4:38 +0:76 +0:76 +0:20
Government Provision Model  6:14  1:67 +4:38 +1:36   +0:35
C. Income Tax Increase
d(C=Y ) d(I=Y ) d(G=Y ) duk dug d	
Private Provision Model +4:90  1:41  0:35  1:58  1:58  0:39
Government Provision Model +4:05  1:48    1:44    0:36
Note: Tables 3A-C report the long-run changes following an underlying scal shock. For
example, if x is an endogenous variable, we report dx = x1 x0, where x1 is the after-shock steady-
state equilibrium value of x and x0 is its pre-shock level. The changes in the growth rates are in
percentages.
TABLE 4
Comparison of Welfare Gains/Losses from Policy Interventions
A. Subsidy to Private Providers versus Government Spending (Lump sum Tax-Financed )
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Private Government Private Government Private Government
" = 0 30:35   5:34 29:92   1:64 29:57 1:52
" = 0:1 49:83 11:14 49:01 14:98 48:35 18:31
" = 0:2 72:14 32:43 70:85 36:28 69:81 39:70
B. Subsidy to Private Providers versus Government Spending (Income Tax-Financed )
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Private Government Private Government Private Government
" = 0 33:55 0:73 30:87 2:54 28:65 4:08
" = 0:1 53:20 16:66 49:86 18:42 47:11 19:98
" = 0:2 75:63 36:89 71:53 38:50 68:17 40:01
C. Income Tax Increase
 = 0  = 0:5  = 1
Private Government Private Government Private Government
" = 0 2:96 3:04 0:86 1:08  0:88   0:53
" = 0:1 2:97 4:18 0:86 2:21  0:88 0:60
" = 0:2 2:98 5:60 0:86 3:62  0:88 2:01
Note: Welfare changes in Tables 4A-C are reported as percentages.
Figure 1.  Infrastructure Subsidy (Private Provision) vs. Public Spending (Government Provision) 
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